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Summary 
 
This paper examines the impact on labour markets in advanced countries (ACs) of the 
integration of the two giant fast-growing countries, China and India, with the liberalised 
global economy.  The integration is taking place under “current globalisation,”  which 
consists of free trade, free capital movements and domestic labour market flexibility 
(instead of free international movement of labour).   The first part reviews economic 
theory as well as several generations of empirical work on the effects of the fast 
expansion of exports from developing countries (DCs) on AC labour markets.  Taking 
into account the positive, the negative, the direct and the indirect effects, the most up-to-
date empirical research suggests that globalisation has a small overall effect on output 
and employment in the US, that is just as likely to be favourable as being unfavourable, 
depending on the time period and the countries considered. 
 
The paper highlights the pioneering contribution of Freeman (2005), which suggests 
that even if trade with the South has not previously disadvantaged North workers, the 
doubling of the global labour force with India and China’s recent integration with the 
international economy may have profoundly unfavourable repercussions for AC 
workers.  Two major points of constructive criticism of the Freeman thesis have been 
emphasised here:  (a) the lack of analysis of the relevant demand side variables and (b) 
inadequate recognition of the inherent economic strength and dynamism of the US 
economy and its innovative large corporations.  These should enable the U.S to 
maintain its technological leadership. 
 
In relation to policy, the underlying question examined here is whether India and 
China’s industrial revolutions, which are a social imperative for these countries, can be 
sustained and made compatible with full employment and rising real wages for workers 
in the North.  It is concluded that current globalisation cannot meet these twin 
objectives and that coordination and cooperation between nation states under alternative 
globalisation are much the better way, if not the only way of realising these goals.  The 
reasons why this should be so are explained in the last part of the paper.  
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1.  Introduction:  the Context 
 
One heartening feature of the evolution of the world economy during the last two to 
three decades has been the outstanding economic success of China and India – two of 
the world’s most populous and hitherto extremely poor countries.  Starting out with the 
world’s largest absolute numbers of people living in poverty, in narrow economic terms 
the two countries have achieved impressive growth.  Graph-1 provides a broad-brush 
statistical profile of GDP growth over the last four decades for China, India, and all 
medium and low-income countries, that is for developing countries (DCs), and for the 
world economy as a whole.  
 
China has undoubtedly been the fastest growing country in the world over the last 
quarter of a century, achieving historically unprecedented, almost double-digit, growth 
rates since 1980.  Similarly, although not as fast as China, India’s economic growth has 
nevertheless also been one of the highest in the world since 1980, its per capita growth 
rate tripling between 1950-1980 and 1980-2005 (Kelkar, 2005).  India was among the 
ten fastest growing countries in the world over each of the two decades 1980-1990 and 
1990-2000.  This record is not matched by any country other than China.  Indeed, the 
acceleration of growth in India and China in the last quarter century is particularly 
remarkable, as it has taken place at a time of deceleration in world economic growth. 
Fast economic growth has led to large-scale income poverty reductions in both 
countries, although the extent in the Indian case since 1990 is still debated.  There have 
also been huge improvements in human development indicators.  For recent 
contributions to this debate see, for example, Abhijit Sen (2005) and Sirinivasan (2003).  
There have also been huge improvements in human development indicators (UNDP, 
2005, Box 1.3).  
 
The rapid economic expansion of these two giants has given rise to serious concerns in 
advanced nations (“the North”) regarding both the short and the long-term implications 
for their people.  Since the end of the “golden age” of fast economic growth in ACs in 
the mid-1970s, most advanced economies have been suffering from serious labour 
market difficulties.  Specifically, workers and trade unions blame competition from 
low-wage economies such as China and India for their problems, namely:  
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 Deindustrialization:  while India and China have been expanding their industry 
at a very fast rate and are undergoing industrial revolutions, the absolute 
numbers employed in manufacturing as well as the share of manufacturing in 
employment in ACs has been falling.  
 
 There has been increasing income inequality in many ACs, particularly the UK 
and the US.   This has often been ascribed to stagnant or falling real wages of the 
unskilled workers in the North as a result of competition from the low-wage 
countries of the South, which, moreover, are alleged not to obey international 
labour standards.  
 
 There have been high rates of unemployment particularly in the European Union 
(EU), which are also popularly attributed to competition from the South. 
 
In the post-World War II period, the economics profession, as well as the traditional 
liberal establishment in the US have favoured free trade and taken a broadly benign 
view of the effects of competition from poor countries on economic welfare in the 
North.1  However, more recently, the methodology for examining this issue has 
provoked passionate controversy.  Krugman (2000) and Leamer (2000), two of the 
world’s leading trade economists, have accused each other of not understanding the 
elements of trade theory in their respective methodological approaches to these issues. 
The legendary Paul Samuelson emerged from retirement to argue that while trade may 
generate gains for many workers it may do actual harm to others, and, in practice, the 
winners may not compensate the losers (either because they cannot or they do not wish 
to).2
 
An essential objective of this paper is to examine the implications for economic welfare 
in the South as well as the North of integrating India and China’s labour markets with 
                                                 
1 See for instance the correspondence between Paul Samuelson and Howard Ellis in relation to the 
publication of the famous Stolper-Samuelson paper in the American Economic Review.  Samuelson 
reports that Ellis in his capacity as president of the American Economic Association, he rejected the paper 
on the grounds that it would undermine the case for free trade. The paper was ultimately published in the 
new journal “The Review of Economic Studies”. See Samuelson (2005). 
2 Economic theory has long suggested, following seminal papers by Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939), that 
as long as the winners can compensate the losers (either directly or through lump-sum sum transfers and 
taxes by the government) the economic measure in question may still be regarded as constrained Pareto 
optimal  
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those of the rest of the world under current rules of globalisation.  It is therefore 
important to describe precisely what these rules are and to outline their significance. 
Globalisation means all things to all people, but for analytical clarity the emphasis here 
is on free movement of capital, goods and services between countries, but excluding 
free flows of labour.  This is despite the fact that the efficiency advantages of the latter 
are likely to be greater than, for example, that of free movement of goods or capital. 
This is for the simple reason that in the real world the price of labour is much more 
distorted compared with distortions in the price of capital or of goods (Rodrik, 2000). 
ACs as well as the international financial institutions (IFIs), which are the principal 
architects of globalisation, suggest fully-flexible labour markets within each country 
rather than the free movement of labour between countries as another essential 
component of current globalisation.  In order to facilitate debate with these institutions 
the same definition of globalisation has been adopted here.   
 
Globalisation has occurred at different speeds in different countries and has often been 
an uneven but cumulative process.  Nevertheless, in most advanced economies, 
globalisation in the above sense of near free trade with very low tariff barriers and 
almost free capital movements was achieved by the first half of the 1980s and in many 
DCs by the early to mid-1990s. Multinational corporations are one of the main actors in 
this globalisation drama.  A relatively small number of these companies have a 
disproportionate share in world trade and world production and, together with large 
financial corporations, are deeply involved in international short- and long-term capital 
flows (See further, Epstein (2005), Dunning (2004)). 
 
It will be instructive to review briefly the experience of the inter-war period in relation 
to the evolution of economic globalisation.  The post-World War I liberal international 
economic regime that operated between major industrial countries came to an end in the 
1930s as a result of the high unemployment associated with the great depression.  Thus 
John Hicks observed:  
 
The main thing which caused so much liberal opinion in England to lose 
faith in Free Trade was the helplessness of the older liberalism in the face 
of massive unemployment, and the possibility of using import restriction 
as an element in an active programme fighting unemployment.  One is, of 
course, obliged to associate this line of thought with the name of Keynes.  
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It was this, almost alone, which led Keynes to abandon his early belief in 
Free Trade.” (Hicks (1959), quoted in Bhagwati (1994)). 
 
 
Orthodox economists often regard globalisation as a technology-driven inexorable 
process, particularly with respect to financial globalisation.  This is partly because once 
(say) finance is deregulated, it becomes very difficult to re-regulate.  What, however, 
the experience of the 1930s suggests is that the present globalisation of free trade and 
free capital movements is simply one way of organising the world economy and will 
only be sustainable if it meets the needs of the people North and South.  Re-regulation 
could take new forms and also use the new technology itself to achieve this. 
 
Thus while the thesis that liberalisation and globalisation are entirely technology-driven 
is far from being convincing, as will be seen below, the ICT revolution nevertheless 
plays a critical role in the present workings of the world economy.  It is central to 
competitiveness and the economic growth of corporations as well as of countries.  It has 
played a particularly important role in India’s economic evolution over the last two 
decades, raising the possibility whether India can leapfrog stages of development.  It has 
arguably been responsible for the continuing strong performance of the US economy in 
terms of output or productivity growth during the last decade (see further Section VI).  
 
To sum up, the present study addresses three analytical and policy questions, as follows: 
 
• The extent to which China’s and India’s economic impact on the rest of the 
world is likely to be different from that of preceding rapid industrialisers (post-
World War II Japan and Korea and Taiwan).  A priori, a difference may arise 
due to the huge size of the two economies, as well as from their large absolute 
numbers of highly skilled workers.  
 
• How to ensure that China’s and India’s present industrial revolutions are 
sustained as it will be argued that they are a social imperative for these 
countries.   They should not be brought to a premature halt by the deficiencies of 
current globalisation.  The latter include, for example, the manifest lack of 
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international coordination of economic activity and volatility of international 
and national financial markets.  
 
• Is the current globalisation efficient from the perspective of labour both in the 
North and the South?  Is there a constellation of policies and institutions that 
could lead to higher wages and higher levels of employment instead of a trade-
off between the two, as is often the case under current globalisation. 
 
These are complex issues, but of great immediacy for economic policy analysis, and 
inevitably subsume many themes and sub-themes.  Those that will be commented on in 
the course of the development of the argument of this paper include, among others, the 
question of revaluing the Chinese currency, the various channels through which 
globalisation may have an impact on economic welfare, issues concerning the jobless 
growth, the formal and informal sectors, the volatility of international capital markets in 
emerging countries, premature de-industrialization in China, India and other DCs, and 
the changing role of services in structural change and economic development, and last 
but not least the ICT revolution and its implications for economic growth and 
distribution.     
 
Having set out the context and objectives of this study, it will be useful at this point to 
describe the organization of the rest of the paper. 
 
Section II outlines the main characteristics of India’s and China’s overall economic 
performance over the last two decades in a long-term historical and comparative 
perspective (see graph 1 and table 1). 
 
Section III analyses some of the structural problems the two countries are encountering 
in continuing and sustaining their respective industrial revolutions (see Tables 2, 3, and 
4).  It notes that neither country’s post-1980 acceleration in economic growth can be 
explained in terms of orthodox economic analysis.   
 
Section IV discusses the labour market difficulties in ACs that are normally attributed to 
integration of developing countries with the world economy and the consequent 
competition from low-wage DCs.   The section documents these difficulties and reviews 
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alternative theoretical approaches as well as three generations of empirical work to 
ascertain the extent if any to which the labour market deficits of the North can be 
attributed to low-wage competition from the South. 
 
Section V outlines Professor Freeman’s (2005) important thesis that integration of the 
new globalizers, India and China, with the liberalised world economy is of a rather 
difficult kind than the integration experiences of the past.  The difference arises 
apparently from the sheer size of the two economies and the high educational level of at 
least a part of their labour force.  Freeman suggests that entry of India and China into 
the global economy poses a serious threat to the economic wellbeing of the US citizens 
both in the short- and long-terms. 
 
Section VI, while being broadly sympathetic to some of Freeman’s study, provides a 
constructive critique of two important aspects of his argument. 
 
Section VII will examine the current financial imbalances in the world economy, and 
propose how these might best be resolved at least cost both to ACs and DCs.  It also 
outlines the institutional changes to current globalisation that may be required to best 
bring about the resolution of these imbalances. 
 
Section VIII provides a conclusion and discusses the policy implications for advanced 
as well as developing countries and multilateral institutions. 
 
In summary, this is essentially an issues paper, the purpose of which is to identify and 
examine systematically the main empirical and policy issues in relation to China’s and 
India’s industrial revolutions and their impact on the labour markets in the US and other 
ACs. The main contributions of the paper are as follows.  Firstly, it pulls together 
material from a wide variety of literatures – micro- as well as macroeconomic.  The 
latter include theories of economic growth, of labour markets, of capital movements, 
international trade, and economic development. Microeconomic theories that underpin 
the analysis include theories of the firm and of finance.  Secondly, it identifies and 
reviews several generations of empirical research on the impact of North-South trade on 
the economic wellbeing of the North’s workers.  Thirdly, it provides a critical analysis 
of a pioneering and already increasingly influential work by Freeman on the 
 8
implications of the doubling of the world labour force.  Fourthly, it suggests how the 
industrial revolutions in India and China can be sustained while maintaining full 
employment with rising real wages in advanced countries.  It outlines the main 
institutional changes and the contours of alternative globalisation for achieving these 
aims. 
 
Above all, this paper will have served its purpose if it helps to bring greater clarity and 
coherence to the consideration of the issues at stake.  
 
II.  India and China and the World Economy 
 
China and India have both made remarkable progress since about 1980, when each 
embarked on economic reform, though under wholly different circumstances.  In China, 
the end of the 1970s marked the emergence of a pragmatic, outward-oriented economic 
and political regime under the aegis of the communist party.  It was closely associated 
with the rise within the party of Deng Xiao Ping and his open door policy. Over the 
following 20 years, China’s economic growth averaged nearly 10 per cent, taking into 
account a recent upward revision of China’s GDP statistics (See further, IMF, 2006, 
Box 1.6, page 37)3.  
 
In India, the 1980s marked a different kind of turning point as the country began to 
undertake deregulation of internal investment activity and regional decentralization of 
economic decision-making.4  This policy shift helped raise the rate of growth from the 
so-called “Hindu rate” of 1.5 per cent annual growth of GDP per capita to about 4 per 
cent.5  This acceleration in economic growth continued into the 1990s and the data 
                                                 
3 Maddison (2005) makes a strong case for using purchasing power parity to measure GDP of countries 
including China.  This is the method used in Table 1. The figures underlying graphs are however 
measured in constant US dollars at relevant exchange rates. 
4 There is a large technical literature on turning points in the Indian economy.  The consensus view is that 
the big turning point in Indian GDP growth occurred in the 1980s, a full ten years before any  significant 
external liberalisation was introduced by Dr. Manmohan Singh in the wake of the 1991 economic crisis. 
For references to this literature and for recent contributions,  see Dasgupta and Singh (2005, 2006) and 
Kohli (2006). 
5 This expression refers to the slow but not dangerously low rate of economic growth achieved by the 
Indian economy under the so-called Nehru-Mahalanobis highly dirigiste import substitution model 
pursued during the period 1950-1990.  Dasgupta and Singh (2005, 2006) and Singh (1990) have argued 
that the Hindu rate of growth does not reflect the true economic capacity of the country as it included the 
period 1965 to 1975 when the country suffered extraordinary external and internal shocks, including three 
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suggests that is has increased further during the new century and, for the last three 
years, the annual GDP growth rate has averaged nearly 8 per cent – a rate never 
achieved before in India.  
 
There are two important points to note about India’s and China’s overall economic 
development (described in long-term comparative historical perspective in Table 1) that 
relate to the world economy.  First, China has emerged as the second largest economy in 
the world after the US, having overtaken Japan. While the Indian economy is not quite 
as large, serious students of the subject suggest that India is likely to grow faster than 
China over the next twenty to thirty years and to have overtaken it by 2050 (Rodrik and 
Subrahmanian, 2004).  This claim is based on a number of assumptions, one of the more 
important of which is that India is thought to have a higher level of “institutional 
development” than China.  This accords with the current thinking in the literature on 
economic development, that its most important “deep” determinant is a country’s 
institutions, i.e., the existence of democracy and the rule of law.  These are said to 
provide the best protection for private property and therefore, within this paradigm, the 
best prospects for economic growth.6  However, it is important to note that in Table 1 
the projected figures for 2030 do not reflect this prospect of India overtaking China but, 
rather, are based on the assumption that growth rates between 2000 and 2030 will be the 
same for both countries, but it will be considerably greater than that of other developing 
and developed countries.  
 
The second point is that, notwithstanding this projected fast economic growth, even in 
the year 2030 China’s GDP per capita in terms of constant purchasing power parity will 
still be a fourth of that of the US, and the corresponding figure for India will be less 
than one seventh.  In considering the future evolution of the world economy, this point 
deserves proper consideration. 
   
                                                                                                                                               
wars, suspension of foreign aid following each war, a maxi-devaluation, major drought and the oil price 
rise.   
 
6 On the general point concerning the role of institutions in economic development, there is a large and 
growing literature.  The main contributions include Rodrik (2004), Bosworth and Collins (2004). 
Acemoglu (2005).  On the specific case of India and its allegedly superior institutions see Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2004).  Kelkar (2004).  See also Dasgupta and Singh (2005) for a somewhat different 
perspective on this issue. 
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Table 2 provides interesting information comparing India’s and China’s catch-up in 
terms of GDP per capita over the last twenty years with that of Japan and South Korea 
which achieved accelerated growth in earlier periods following the Second World War. 
The figures reveal that fast growth in China and India is not dissimilar to that in South 
Korea and Japan during their fast growth phases.  The significance of China’s and 
India’s catch up is its much greater impact on the world economy in view of the sheer 
size of these countries’ populations and GDP.  The two countries jointly constitute 
about 20 per cent of the world’s output and could therefore comprise in principle a new 
engine of world economic growth.  The two countries already provide a sizable share of 
world demand for consumer goods as well as commodities and capital goods.7  
 
These transformations in the Chinese and Indian economies are reflected in widespread 
progress on a number of fronts.  Both countries have greatly increased their share of 
world exports of manufactures, though at a much faster pace for China than India (Table 
3).   In absolute terms there are more engineering and science students graduating from 
each of these two countries than from either the US or the European Union.  There have 
also been important structural changes in both economies, though subject to 
qualifications discussed below.  Table 4 further indicates that, on various fronts, at least 
in the short-term and up to now, China has achieved relatively more than India. 
 
Since the beginning of China’s open door policy in 1979, the country has broadly 
followed a strategy of export-led growth.  As a consequence, the Chinese economy has 
experienced fast integration with the world economy.  The Chinese share of world 
manufacturing exports rose from less that 1 per cent in 1981-1985 to 6.2 per cent in 
2001-2003.  Whalley (2006) reports that the growth of total exports in recent years has 
been of the order of 30 to 40 per cent and that, if these growth rates continue, by 2010 
China will account for a massive 50 per cent of world trade.  Starting from a tiny share 
of world trade (imports plus exports) in the 1980s, China today is the third largest 
trading economy after the US and Germany.  Table 3 also indicates that, in 2003, the 
Indian share of total world merchandize trade (imports plus exports) was only 0.7 per 
cent compared with 5.8 per cent for China. 
                                                 
7 However, India’s per capita income even in purchasing parity terms is considerably lower than that in 
advanced countries.  Nevertheless, there are 100 million Indians who currently have per capita incomes 
greater than US $5,000 a year, thus constituting a massive middle class market for domestic and, more 
importantly, imported consumer goods.  
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Furthermore, China now accounts for about 60 per cent of FDI inflows from OECD to 
non-OECD countries.  As Table 3 suggests, China’s stock of inward FDI amounted to 
US $501.5 billion in 2003, which was 15 times larger than that of India’s.  Similarly, in 
China in 2003 FDI accounted for 12.4 per cent of a much higher level of capital 
formation than was the case in India, where FDI’s share was only 4 per cent of a lower 
level of investment.  
 
Combined with the policy of keeping large-scale foreign currency reserves as an 
insurance against the disruptive financial crises of the kind experienced in the late 1990s 
by Asian countries, China strategy of export-led growth has been highly successful in 
narrow economic terms but there are questions about its sustainability.  These largely 
arise from China’s trade surplus with the US (discussed later).  
 
India’s economic growth, on the other hand, has been more geared to the domestic 
market, and hence its export sector is currently of less concern to other countries. 
India’s economic growth is therefore in principle more sustainable and less subject to 
retaliatory measures. 
 
These issues of China’s and India’s growth strategies, their compatibility with other 
national economic interests and policy implications both internally and externally will 
be discussed in detail in later sections.  
 
III.  Sustainability of China’s and India’s Industrial Revolutions 
 
In considering the sustainability of China’s and India’s industrial revolutions, it is useful 
to start with the observation that both countries’ accelerated economic growth since 
1980 provides in different ways serious challenges to received economic analysis.  
 
In the case of China, contrary to what current theory of development suggests, there are 
no well-defined property rights either in agriculture or industry; the markets for most 
products are highly segmented and imperfect; the capital market can best be described 
as being embryonic; the labour market is still subject to considerable government 
planning and although there is some fluidity in the market for unskilled industrial labour 
there are still wide-spread restrictions on internal migration.  From the perspective of 
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orthodox economic analysis, these imperfections impede resource flows and lead to 
misallocations.  Nevertheless, notwithstanding these deficiencies, the Chinese economy 
has achieved extraordinary growth for twenty years.8
 
The Chinese claim that they are pursuing a strategy of socialist economic development 
with Chinese characteristics.  This has meant a relatively slow transition from a planned 
command economy to a market economy where prices are determined by the forces of 
supply and demand.  It is useful to note that the Chinese have been following an 
industrial policy on the pattern of South Korea and Japan by creating capabilities in the 
form of large industrial firms able to compete in world markets (Nolan, 2004).  In a 
recent paper, Brandt, Rawski and Sutton (forthcoming, p.1) regard the main 
achievement of China’s industrial revolution so far to be “the emergence of mechanisms 
for extending industrial capability.”  The authors identify the latter as being the capacity 
to export an ever-widening range of products.  This, they believe, will sustain China’s 
industrial revolution.  
    
China, of course, has also been the recipient of major multinational investment.  This is 
despite the fact that the country does not run a liberal investment regime, but imposes 
various kinds of restrictions including for example joint ventures with Chinese firms in 
order to draw maximum benefit from such investments.9  To explain the Chinese 
performance, non-orthodox economists suggest the following kinds of factors: 
extraordinarily high rates of investment, an ability to marry the market with the plan, an 
incentive system reflecting planning priorities, and China’s advantage in using the 
command economy to build world class industrial, scientific and educational 
infrastructure, both soft and hard.  (See, for example, Qian et al (2000), Taube (2005), 
Opper (2005)).   
 
The changes introduced by Deng Xiao Ping’s historic shift of China’s ideological 
direction from a command economy to a socialist commodity economy facilitated 
inflows of investment by the Chinese diaspora in South East and East Asia.  It is 
arguable that these ideological and associated policy changes contributed to the Chinese 
                                                 
8 For an early contribution, see Singh (1996).  For more recent work see text below.   
9 See, for example, Singh (2004), Lall (2004), UNCTAD (2005). 
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diaspora effectively becoming an early and important part of what may be regarded as 
the new Chinese capitalist class.   
   
In short, there is general consensus that whatever the causes of accelerated economic 
growth, there are no reasons to doubt that in terms of domestic capabilities the Chinese 
industrial revolution will continue.  The Chinese have world-class domestically owned 
firms and a strategically open competitive economy.  The Chinese government seems to 
be fully aware of a number of current factors that may have negative effects, such as 
corruption, rising inequality of income distribution, the spatial over-concentration of 
industry and its implications for labour, the net fiscal costs of state-owned firms.  In 
relation to the latter, as OECD (2005) report on the Chinese economy notes, for the last 
five years, the Chinese government has been involved in a vast programme of 
restructuring the state-owned industrial sector, reducing its payroll, and rearranging the 
provision of social welfare benefits.  OECD observes that no European country has 
undertaken such a vast reform programme.  
 
As in the case of China, close examination of the post-1980 acceleration of economic 
growth in India also does not fit the orthodox analysis.  As noted earlier, contrary to the 
expectations of the IFIs and orthodox economists, the major turning point in India’s 
economic growth occurred in 1980, rather than in 1990.  Had it occurred ten years later, 
faster growth could have been ascribed to the liberalisation programme introduced by 
the government in response to the 1991 crisis.  There is a large literature discussing the 
timing of and reasons for the 1980 turning point.  Some emphasize macroeconomic 
policies introduced to induce a much more expansive policy stance in the post 1980 era; 
others suggest a change in Indira Gandhi’s ideological position from an anti-business to 
pro-business stance.  The present author has suggested that accelerated economic 
growth in the post 1980 period resulted from economic reform which promoted internal 
liberalisation while maintaining external controls much as before.  The government 
itself had concluded that, on the basis of a large number of reports by its own high level 
committees, that the massive government controls on private sector domestic 
investment were counter-productive.10  The domestic investment regime was therefore 
greatly liberalised in the 1980s, leading to a huge supply response from Indian private 
                                                 
10 Private sector investment was subject to comprehensive controls under the import substitution regime.  
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enterprise for both the domestic and the foreign markets.11  These alternative 
explanations for the 1980 turning point are not, however, necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  
 
The role of external liberalisation in bringing about a trend increase in growth rate is 
still very much in dispute.  This is because despite extensive external liberalisation in 
the early 90s there was no further acceleration in Indian economic growth during the 
90s compared with the 80s.  Nevertheless, casual evidence strongly suggests since 2000 
there has been a further trend increase in the rate of economic growth from about six per 
cent to around eight per cent.  However, it is arguable that this faster growth is based 
less on external liberalisation, but much more so on a more active entrepreneurial spirit, 
manifested in greater domestic investment.  The latter’s share in GDP has risen from 
about 23 per cent to 29 per cent and this increased investment appears to be the main 
driver of growth.  Indian entrepreneurs today are evidently much more confident about 
government policy as well as India’s place in the international economy than they have 
been in the past.  
 
Although as indicated above, both China and India have the capacity and the 
capabilities on the supply side of achieving fast economic growth, there are nevertheless 
serious questions about the sustainability of these high growth rates from a structural 
perspective owing to the observed slow rate of structural change.  Table 4, which 
reports on the structure of a sample of Asian and Latin American countries, suggests 
that relatively little change has occurred during the last quarter century.  In interpreting 
the date in Table 4, two things need to be borne in mind. First the figures for industry 
also include mining and oil extraction. In terms of the theory of structural change and 
economic growth, it is manufacturing - a sub-category of industry that is deemed to be 
important – because of its assumed superior dynamism and spill-over effects.  The 
second caveat with respect to the Table 4 is that it assumes constant domestic terms of 
trade between agriculture industry and services.  However, empirical studies suggest 
that the terms of trade between industry and services change in favour of services during 
the course of economic growth.  Therefore, other things being equal, the share of 
manufacturing in current prices should fall and that of services should rise even if there 
                                                 
11 For some early contributions to this debate, see, for example, Isher Ahluwalia (1985), Montek 
Ahluwalia (1986), Singh and Ghosh (1988). For more recent contributions see Kohli (2006), Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2004), DasGupta and Singh (2005).     
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was no change in their respective levels of production.  This effect will not be present if 
all the relevant variables were measured in constant prices.  Both these caveats must be 
kept in mind in making comparisons between countries, which is the main purpose of 
Table 4.  
 
Slow structural change is understandable in the case of economies that are not growing 
fast, but much less so for China and India which have grown rapidly over the last 
quarter of a century.  As Table 4 indicates the share of industry in India rose from 20 
per cent to 27 per cent in the period 1960 to 2000.  However, most of this increase took 
place between 1960 and 1980.  Since the latter date, industry’s share has increased by 
only one percentage point.  In China, the share of industry rose from 47 to 49 per cent 
between 1980 and 2000.  The corresponding figures for the share of industry indicate a 
decline in the period 1980 and 2000 in all Latin America countries, except Venezuela, 
where the high share of industry is presumably due to oil extraction and refining rather 
than to manufacturing.  
 
There is also evidence reviewed in DasGupta and Singh (2005) suggesting that many 
DCs in the most recent period have been suffering from premature deindustrialization.  
Both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence from past economic development 
suggest that, as per capita incomes rise, the share of industry in GDP and employment 
increases until a very high level of per capita income is reached, after which the share of 
both begins to fall, though the employment share tends to fall first.  However, it is found 
that for many DCs, the share of industrial employment has begun to fall at much lower 
levels of per capita income than has hitherto been the case.  In that sense, Table 5, that 
gives sectoral employment shares, suggests that China has been de-industrializing 
mildly for some years now, while India has not.  The latter’s share of manufacturing 
employment has been increasing, albeit at a very slow rate.  However, further analysis 
indicates that the share of modern manufacturing labour in India has declined, so that all 
net additional manufacturing jobs have been created in the informal sector.12
 
                                                 
12 There is no uniform definition of the informal sector. See further Harris-White (2003) and Dasgupta 
and Singh (2005).  The informal manufacturing sector in India has a precise statistical definition, namely 
all establishments of ten or less employees and that use electrical  power, and those establishments with 
more than ten employees that do not use electrical power.  See further Dasgupta and Singh (2006). 
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An important question arises whether this premature de-industrialization pattern of 
economic development will prove to be a hindrance to further development of the 
economy or whether it could be a benign feature. It will be appreciated that 
deindustrialization (especially in terms of employment) in and of itself is not always a 
necessarily negative development, as for example when a country has over-manning and 
surplus labour in manufacturing.  Deindustrialization becomes problematical only if it 
stops the economy from achieving its full potential, or the social implications are 
unacceptable.  Whether there is such a pathological outcome depends on the nature and 
extent of the country’s interactions with the rest of the world.  As manufacturing is 
critical to current account balance, a weak or inefficient manufacturing sector may force 
the economy to work below its potential, for example, below the full employment level; 
or the economy may be able to achieve full employment only at levels of exchange 
rates, which lead to unacceptable inflation.13  
 
This issue is particularly important for the Indian economy, where services have grown 
faster than manufacturing in the last ten years.14  Services have grown at an annual rate 
of 8 per cent while manufacturing has grown by 6 per cent (Dasgupta and Singh, 2005).  
The faster growth of services is largely due to the fast growth of the use of IT in 
domestic and foreign industry and services. But fast growth overall has been jobless, 
that is, in both the formal manufacturing as already noted above, and also in the formal 
services sector.  Many Indian economists have argued that this pattern of growth is 
lopsided and unsustainable.  They suggest that India will need to have fast growth of 
low-skill manufactured exports to remedy the situation and avoid social unrest (Joshi 
(2004). 
 
It may be noted that the IT sector itself, despite India’s advantage, can only make a 
limited direct contribution to growth of output and employment as it employs a mere 1 
per cent of India’s labour force.  However the sector’s indirect contribution to the 
economy is far larger.  This is because it generates twenty per cent of the country’s total 
                                                 
13 The relationship between per capita income and share of manufacturing in output and employment, 
changes in terms of domestic and external terms of trade are complex issues.  (See further Baumol, 
Blackman and Wolffe (1989), Rowthorn and Wells (1986), Blackaby (1978), Cairncross (1978), Kaldor 
(1978), Singh (1977, 1989, 1992), Howes and Singh (2000).      
14 Although the Chinese economy has also suffered from premature de-industrialization, the rate of 
growth of services in that country has not been greater than that of manufactures.  This differentiates the 
Chinese economy from that of Inida. 
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exports and thereby helps to relax the balance of payments constraint for the economy 
as a whole.  This contribution is already significant and is expected to become even 
more so in the future.  The Economist (June 3, 2006, p.7), in a survey of business in 
India, reports on a recent Nasscom-McKinsey study forecasting India’s BPO (business 
back office) export revenues.  The latter were worth US$ 5.2 billion in 2005 and are 
expected to increase five-fold to reach a level of over US$ 25 billion in 2010, a 
compound annual growth rate of 37 per cent.  Using a Kaldorian analysis, Dasgupta and 
Singh (2005, 2006) have argued that the ITC sector is an additional engine of growth for 
the Indian economy, now and well into the future.  It more than meets the criteria 
normally applied to manufacturing for regarding it as an engine of growth. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that, despite the disappointing overall formal sector 
employment outcomes of fast economic growth, it is socially imperative that India’s 
industrial revolution should continue, including the further development of the IT sector 
and its progressively wide use in all other sectors of the economy.  This is the challenge 
facing India’s policy makers to bring about wide adoption and diffusion of this 
technology in order to enhance competitiveness and productivity throughout the 
economy.  This alone may enable the economy to be run at a level that would ensure 
full employment at rising real wages.  The latter constitute the long-term requirements 
for social peace (Singh, 2000).      
 
There are other challenges for both economies that lie more in the realm of 
developments in the international economy, over which currently China and India, 
despite their size, have relatively little control.  This boils down in the short to medium 
term to the current financial imbalances in the world economy and how these can best 
be resolved, without jeopardizing the industrial revolution in these two countries and 
economic prospect elsewhere in the South.  In the longer term, the point at issue is 
whether current globalisation is optimal for the people of the world as a whole, or 
whether a different regime would be likely to be more beneficial.  As indicated in the 
Introduction, these issues are taken up in sections VII and VIII.   
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IV.  Globalisation and Labour Market Difficulties in the North 
 
It will be useful to start with some stylised facts concerning labour market difficulties in 
ACs, which are normally attributed to integration of developing countries with the 
world economy and the consequent competition from low wage DCs. 
 
• The growth rate of the average real wage in the US was 0.25 per cent per year 
during the 1980s and 1990s compared with the historic norm of 2 per cent per 
year.  As a result of the ‘new economy’ boom of the late 1990s the real wages of 
the median worker rose by 6 per cent over the period 1995-2000. However, 
since 2000 the median worker’s wages have risen by less than 1 per cent per 
annum, even though overall productivity growth during the period 1995-2005 
has been much faster (about 3 per cent per annum).  US productivity growth is 
discussed further in the sections which follow. 
 
• Wage dispersion and income inequality in the US greatly increased during the 
1980s and 90s, having remained steady or declined for almost fifty years before. 
Saez and Piketty (2006) estimate that the share of aggregate income received by 
the top one per cent of income earners has doubled from 8 per cent to over 16 
per cent in 2004; that received by the top one tenth of one per cent has increased 
more than three fold, from 2 per cent in 1980 to 7 per cent a quarter of a century 
later; that received by the top one hundredth of one per cent (14,000 highest tax 
payers) quadrupled over the same period from 0.65 per cent to 2.87 per cent. 
The picture which emerges from this latest data on US incomes is that the wages 
of the lowest decile of workers has increased; those at the top are forging ahead 
whilst median workers are being squeezed.  Similarly, in the US large 
corporations the average chief executive used to earn about ten times as much as 
the average worker in 1970. Now he or she earns three hundred times as much15.  
 
• It is a remarkable fact that the US economy has been much more stable over the 
last fifteen years than ever before.  The long Clinton up-swing lasted a record 
eight years and the recession since then in 2000-2001 was relatively mild. 
                                                 
15 The source of the data in this paragraph is the Economist (2006), p. 28. 
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However, paradoxically the incomes of the firms and middle-income workers 
are subject to much greater fluctuations than was the case twenty years ago16.  
 
• There has been considerable de-industrialisation, with millions of people leaving 
good jobs in manufacturing and being relocated in ‘informal’ service sector jobs, 
or remaining unemployed.  It will, however, be recognised that de-
industrialisation has been a long-term trend for the economies of the advanced 
countries, starting well before the competition from developing countries came 
on the scene.  Thus, the Economist (2005) estimates that the US manufacturing 
industry employed 25 per cent of the workforce in 1970, but only 10 per cent 
today.  The decline has been sharper still in the UK with the manufacturing 
workforce being reduced from 35 per cent to 14 per cent in the same period.  As 
we saw earlier, even developing countries have been experiencing de-
industrialisation in the sense above, i.e. a fall in the proportion of people 
employed in manufacturing.  Some of the fall is indeed due to changes in 
statistical definitions of what constitutes manufacturing and what comprises 
services, but serious students of the subject believe that this factor can account 
for only a small proportion of the observed decline in the manufacturing labour 
force (Coutts and Rowthorn, 2005). 
 
• In contrast to acute deterioration in income distribution in the US, European 
countries have suffered instead from mass unemployment.  To illustrate this 
point, consider the case of Germany between 1964 and 1973, the last ten years 
of the Golden Age (1950-73), the country’s average unemployment rate was less 
than 1%.   During the last ten years (chronologically) the rate is about 9%, which 
would have been unthinkable in the Golden Age.  Some of the differences in the 
two figures is, indeed, due to the fact that the former statistic refers to West 
Germany and the latter refers to Germany as a whole.  This, however, does not 
detract from the main point that there has been a huge trend increase in German 
                                                 
16 On economic stability in ACs see Martin and Rowthorn (2005), in relation to stability in DCs see 
Fagernas and Singh (2006). 
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unemployment since the golden age.  The same holds true to a lesser or greater 
extent for many other European countries.17   
 
A central question for this paper is to what extent if any these labour market 
difficulties of the North can be ascribed to competition from the low-waged labour 
products from the South.  It is indeed true that DC exports expanded at a very fast 
rate during 1980s and 90s leading to a big increase, (albeit starting from a very low 
level) in their share of the world manufacturing exports and a corresponding fall in 
that of DCs.  As Table 6 indicates the United Kingdom accounted for more than 
12% of the world exports of manufactures in 1962-1965.  By 2001-2003, its share 
has fallen to just over 5% which is less than that of China (6.2%).  The latter had a 
negligible share of world manufacturing exports as late as 1985.  Although this fast 
growth of exports from DCs has occurred about the same time as the labour market 
difficulties of the Northern workers documented above, it does not necessarily 
follow that one has caused the other.  
 
Economic theory does not, unfortunately, provide clear-cut answers as to how this 
causal question should be tackled empirically.  The pure neo-classical theory is 
singularly unsuited for this purpose as it assumes full employment. Unemployment 
in this traditional model arises entirely from market imperfections including those in 
the labour market.   In a less pure form, the theory can be used to consider questions 
of unemployment by postulating labour market rigidities in the face, for example, of 
changing comparative advantages for good and services between countries. 
However, the theory suggests that this will be a temporary phenomenon and the 
                                                 
17 Similarly in France during the last ten years of the golden age (1964-1973) the average standardized 
unemployment rate was about 2.5 per cent.  By the 1990s, the average rate had risen to well above 10 per 
cent.  Despite the enormous economic and social concern with mass unemployment, between 2003-06, 
the French unemployment rate remained close to 10 per cent.   It may however be observed that although 
average unemployment rose in most advanced countries, there were exceptions, notably some north 
European countries as well as Austria.  In Anglo-Saxon countries, including the US and UK, 
unemployment rose in the 1980s and early 1990s but was eventually controlled by following arguably the 
policies of labour market flexibility (i.e.,  reducing the scope of the welfare state, privitization, 
deregulation, and increasing competition in all spheres).   These are however controversial questions with 
a large body of literature.  This literature is referred to in Singh (1995) and Glyn (2006). 
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resources will ultimately be optimally employed through the normal working of the 
market system (Beanstock, 1984).18
 
In contrast to the classical analysis the Keynesian approach allows explicit 
consideration of the question of unemployment and balance of payments constraints. 
Following this approach, Singh (1989) suggested that in order to empirically test 
whether trade with the Third World was responsible for the labour market 
difficulties of AC workers discussed above, the following issues required 
examination: 
 
• Was the country in long-term structural disequilibrium in the sense that it 
was unable to operate at its full economic potential, e.g. it became balance of 
payments constrained well before full employment was reached.  The 
emphasis was on the long-term, as any temporary disequilibria may be 
speedily resolved by normal market forces.  The notions of “structural” refer 
here to the fact that market solutions such as devaluation might not be 
adequate to restore full employment.19 
 
• If the economy was indeed in long-term structural disequilibrium, was this 
caused by trade in manufacturing or in other products.  
 
• If it was being caused by trade in manufacturing, was it due to trade with the 
Third World or ACs. 
 
It is only after all these tests have been carried out that one can estimate to what extent, 
if any, Southern trade in manufacturing is responsible for the North’s labour market 
difficulties.  And, indeed Singh (1989) found that UK’s trade in manufactures with the 
Third World countries in the 1970s led to a small net increase in employment rather 
than a decrease.  The above approaches were used in what may be called the first 
                                                 
18 In measuring the effect of third world imports on employment in advanced countries the typical 
mainstream ‘first-generation’ models were particularly simplistic and limited (see Singh, 1987 for fuller 
discussion). 
19 As much of the competition in international trade among advanced countries takes place in non-price 
terms, the extent of the devaluation required may be too large to correct the trade balance.  A devaluation 
will affect all prices and also have a distributional impact, often leading to real wage resistance by 
workers, and thereby undermining wage-price flexibility.  
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generation of empirical studies of North-South trade mainly pertaining to the period 
1960-1980. 
 
The second generation of these studies, covering the subsequent period, roughly 1980-
2000, have included contributions from trade economists as well as labour economists. 
Although they had strong theoretical differences, in empirical terms the two groups 
have produced broadly similar results.  This body of empirical work reached the overall 
conclusion that the ACs manufacturing trade with DCs during the 1980s was 
responsible for about 20% of the observed wage dispersion in the US20. It was also 
thought to contribute to de-industrialization and unemployment on a similar modest 
scale.21  Most of the observed negative changes in the labour market outcomes in the 
North were thus ascribed to technology rather than to globalisation  in this analysis.  
 
 Most researchers accept the view that the proximate cause of the negative labour 
market outcomes in the North, has been a fall in the demand for un-skilled labour which 
in turn is ascribed to either trade or technology. Professor Sir Tony Atkinson (1999, 
2000, 2001) refers to this common view as the transatlantic consensus, since it provides 
a unified explanation for both unemployment in Western Europe and inequality in 
income distribution in the US.  It does so by making the auxiliary assumption that 
labour markets in Western Europe are highly imperfect because of the welfare state etc., 
so that reduced demand for unskilled labour leads to unemployment rather than reduced 
wages.  However in the US, the flexible labour market prevents unemployment at the 
expense of unfavourable changes in income distribution. 
 
Be that as it may, the most recent research on the subject that includes the data for the 
1990s leads to radically different conclusions.  It suggests that neither trade nor 
technology can satisfactorily explain the observed changes, either in income distribution 
in the US or in unemployment in Europe.  This third generation of empirical work on 
the North-South trade suggests that macroeconomic factors, including decline in 
                                                 
20 For recent reviews of this literature see Slaughter and Swagel (1997), Atkinson (1999,2000,2001), 
Singh (2003a) and Gottschalk and Smeeding  (1997). 
21However, Wood (1994) regards North-South manufacturing trade to be a major cause of the adverse 
labour market outcomes in the North.  For alternative perspectives see the references cited in footnote 17.  
See also Singh’s (1995c)  review of Wood. 
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unionisation and variables such as social norms are more important than either trade or 
technology, in explaining the observed changes in the 1990s. 
 
To elaborate, at an empirical level this third generation work, covering the most recent 
ten year period, suggests that the trade story is not convincing as earnings dispersion has 
increased not only in the US traded sector but also in the far bigger non-traded sector.  
This points towards some common forces at work other than trade.  Moreover, as 
Krugman (2000) and others have pointed out despite the relative rise in skills premiums 
in the 1980's, the demand for skilled workers rose rather than fell in most sectors of the 
economy.   This again points towards a non-trade explanation, indeed, in the direction 
of a broad-based skill-biased technical progress.   Thus, on the face of it, the technology 
hypothesis would appear to be a better explanation of some of the observed trends in 
unemployment and wage dispersion than the globalization theory.  However, there are 
faults in the technology story as well which require careful consideration.  These 
deficiencies will be reviewed below. 
 
The first important point is the latest available data on earnings and income distribution 
for the period since the mid-1990's does not support the underlying premise of either 
trade or technology theories.  Evidence for the period 1995-1999 suggests that the 
bottom decile of wage earners in countries such as the US and the UK have gained at 
the expense of the average worker, thus calling into question the shift of demand away 
from unskilled and low paid workers to the skilled and the more highly paid.  This is 
contrary to the predictions of the trade theory since imports from developing countries 
or foreign outsourcing by the large US companies, have not slowed down but have 
continued to increase throughout the 1990's. 
 
Skill-bias in technical progress is also difficult to reconcile with the 1995-1999 evidence 
of the gains of the low paid presumably unskilled workers at the expense of the average 
more skilled worker.  
 
There are also other important difficulties with the technology story.  As noted earlier 
income distribution has become more unequal not only between industries but also 
within industries and firms.  It has also become more unequal in narrowly defined 
occupations such as lawyers, doctors, cooks.  It is difficult to believe that this increased 
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dispersion is in each case due to skill biased techniques progress.  There is little to 
suggest that the highest-paid lawyers are being paid relatively even more than before 
because (say) technical progress in the form of information technology has improved 
their skills more than that of the average lawyer. 
 
Katz (1999), suggests that the rate of growth of relative demand for college graduates 
has fallen substantially in the 1990's, compared not only with the 1980's but also with 
the 1950's and the subsequent decades.  If the technology hypothesis were valid for the 
last two decades, the data should indicate a trend increase in the rate of growth of 
relative demand for college graduates in the 1980's and 1990's, which Katz's figures do 
not. 
 
Equally significantly, empirical studies of the effects of trade and technology on AC 
labour markets, do not take into account changes in terms of trade, which are connected 
with the trade with the South and which have a highly positive effect on the welfare in 
the North.  To illustrate, the large devaluations that occurred in the crisis affected Asian 
countries as a consequence of the acute macro-economic disturbances in the region in 
the period 1997 to 2000, did not cause serious difficulties for US industry as was feared. 
Instead, improvements in terms of trade helped reduce inflation in the US which 
enabled the Federal Reserve to run the economy at a higher level of output and 
employment than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
This point together with some additional new third generation of empirical studies of 
North-South interactions will be taken up further in section VII. 
 
V.  Dangers from New Globalisers for ACs – The Freeman Thesis 
 
As indicated in the last section, the third generation of empirical work on the impact of 
North-South trade in manufacturers on the labour markets in the ACs do not suggest 
that globalisation is responsible for the large increase in income inequality in the US or 
mass unemployment in W. Europe.  This third generation empirical work encompassed 
statistical data covering the 1990s till 2000 i.e. the latest available data.  However, it is 
important to note that although globalisation may not have been a malevolent force in 
the past, there is no guarantee that it may not adversely affect the North’s labour 
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markets in the future.  This is precisely Prof. Richard Freeman of Harvard University’s 
(2005) contention in his 2004  Sicilliano lecture.  Freeman’s contribution is important in 
part because ten years ago he had written a seminal article with a provocative title “Are 
Your Wages Set in Beijing”?  Freeman (1995) at that time argued that this was not the 
case and there was insufficient integration between the US and the Chinese labour 
markets to warrant the conclusion that it is the Chinese rather than the US labour 
market, which determines employment and wages for US workers.  Professor Freeman 
today reaches more or less the opposite conclusion. 
 
Freeman’s new line of thought, which regards globalisation as a potentially major threat 
for the North’s workers, chimes in very well with popular sentiment in advanced 
countries (ACs).  Opinion polls indicate 6 out of 10 citizens in the US are not persuaded 
by the supposed benefits of globalisation.  This is quite remarkable in view of the fact 
that the US economy has recorded the strongest growth rate of all major economies in 
the last 10 years and, as suggested earlier, it has also been much more stable than ever 
before.  However, as also noted earlier, wages and salaries have been more volatile than 
before which suggests that the general scepticism about globalisation is perhaps not so 
remarkable after all.  Freeman’s 2005 contribution provides a formidable and 
sophisticated articulation of this sentiment; further, in addition to the short term, 
Freeman is very much concerned with the potential adverse long-term effects of global 
economic integration.  The latter aspect adds to the weight of Freeman’s analysis. 
 
The essential basis for Freeman’s argument is his observation that the global labour 
force has all of a sudden doubled with the entry of India, China and former Soviet Block 
countries into the liberalised global market in the recent period.  He suggests that in 
1985 there were about a billion workers who competed with each other under 
‘globalisation’ i.e. these countries by then had achieved more or less free trade and more 
or less free capital movements amongst themselves.  This globalised countries group at 
the time consisted of the OECD economies and Latin America.  According to 
Freeman’s estimate, approximately 960 million people worked in these countries in 
1980.  By the year 2000, the size of this labour force had increased to 1460 million 
workers, mainly through population growth in the developing countries part of this 
group.   However, with the entry of India and China and the former Soviet bloc 
countries into the globalised economy, by the year 2000 the global labour force had 
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doubled to 3 billion, of which nearly half, i.e. 1.47 billion were the Chinese, Indian and 
other new entrants to the labour force (see Graph 2).  This doubling of the labour force 
of the world’s integrating liberal capitalist economy Freeman suggests, has, on the 
whole, pleasant consequences for low income countries such as India and China, but 
potentially rather unpleasant outcomes for high wage workers in rich countries. 
 
Freeman notes that these additional 1.5 billion workers from the newly globalising 
countries had brought very little capital with them.  As a result, the global capital labour 
ratio was cut to 55 percent of its pre-2000 level.  This decline in the world capital labour 
ratio not only reduces average productivity but also makes capital scarce shifting the 
balance of power towards it. 
 
The conventional analysis of North-South trade involves the notion that countries 
should produce according to their comparative advantage, with rich countries 
specializing in skill intensive or capital-intensive products and poor countries in labour-
intensive and less skilled products.  Freeman regards this theory as obsolete in view of 
the outsourcing of many skill intensive jobs to the South and the ability of countries like 
India and China to produce more absolute numbers of engineers and science graduates 
than the US In 2003, China graduated 325,000 engineers and the US only 65,000.  Even 
taking into account the technical superiority of the American engineers over the 
Chinese, this difference is too large for US comfort. Freeman argues that the probability 
of achieving technological innovations depends on the absolute numbers of technically 
trained people rather than their relative numbers.  The reality according to Freeman is 
that the US is likely to lose its technological lead unless it takes extraordinary steps to 
reverse the present course of events.  In the hi-tech sector, US pre-eminence is visibly 
under threat.  The US share of world exports of hi-tech manufacturers fell from 30 
percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 2000 and similarly its share of imports rose from 13 to 
18 percent over the same period.  To sum up, Freeman is basically suggesting that 
industrial revolutions in China and India, represent gigantic supply-side shocks for 
many parts of the world economy, particularly the US These are likely to be extremely 
disruptive and harmful for these countries and regions not just in the short-run but also 
importantly in the long-term.   
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Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that Freeman does not advocate protection as a 
way out of these difficulties.  However, though non-protectionist, Freeman’s policy 
perspective is highly interventionist, and none the worse for that.  He calls for resolute 
and determined government intervention, at the national as well as at the international 
levels to manage the transition during which the new globalisers will catch up with the 
United States.  He expects this transition to be long and protracted – it may take as 
much as thirty to forty years.  His examples of good transition include West European 
catch-up after World War II; the bad transitions include southern American states’ 
integration after the civil war with the more industrialised north.  These also include the 
East German integration with West Germany after the break-up of the Berlin Wall. 
Freeman argues against the current ‘Washington Consensus’ globalisation that, in his 
view, is biased towards protecting the interests of capital.  He writes eloquently: “The 
international financial institutions may have to worry about instability of capital markets 
and crony corrupt capitalists, but they don’t have to worry about capital more broadly:  
George Soros and his billionaire friends can take care of themselves.  It is the average 
worker in the world who needs the protection of the international community” (Rocco 
C. and Marion S.  Siciliano Forum (2005), pages not numbered). 
 
VI.  Supply-side Shocks and the Growth of Demand 
 
Professor Freeman’s apprehensions about the impact of China’s and India’s integration 
on the North’s workers are well argued and supported by careful analysis and evidence. 
Like his 1995 article, this research represents a seminal contribution to the debate on 
this important subject.   His arguments therefore require careful consideration. 
 
At a theoretical level Professor Freeman’s essential argument is that the supply side 
shock of doubling of the world’s labour force will have a profound impact on labour 
markets in other countries.  The size of the shock will make it disruptive, as will the fact 
that India and China both have a huge advantage over the US in terms of the absolute 
number of science and engineering students that graduate every year.  There is much in 
Freeman’s analysis I agree with, but there are also parts with which I have difficulties. 
For reasons of space and to add to the debate, it is the latter that I highlight below. 
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Thus, one important shortcoming of Freeman’s analysis, in my view, is that it provides 
very little explicit consideration of demand side factors. In an early contribution, Singh 
(1977) suggested that foreign competition and the balance of payments position of an 
economy can affect its growth and industrial development through three distinct but 
related channels:  (a) through the level and growth of demand; (b) through the structure 
of demand and (c) importantly, through investment.  In considering these channels, R.S. 
Sayers’s (1965) simple distinction between the complementary and competitive aspects 
of economic growth elsewhere is useful.  Economic growth elsewhere, Sayers suggested 
in his seminal paper, is complementary to the extent that it raises demand for exports, 
but it becomes competitive in so far as it leads to the development of alternative sources 
of supply.  His central point is that “the expansion of the world economy, although it 
may raise the demand for a country’s products, also creates alternative sources of 
supply, which may compete with them in any market, including its home market. So, 
from the point of view of a particular country, the development of the world economy 
may be characterised by a changing balance between ‘complementarity’ and 
‘competitiveness’.” 
 
In the specific case of the integration of China and India with the world economy, 
economic growth in these two countries is on the whole likely to be more 
complementary than competitive with the US economy and that of many other 
countries.  The essential point is that India and China, by virtue of their size and high 
growth rates which they require for meeting their huge employment and other social 
needs, now constitute another growth pole for the world economy.  Together, these two 
countries account for 20 percent of world production and world demand.  Their demand 
side effects have already led to expansion in several countries, both developed and 
developing.  There is evidence that in the recent period China’s trade with Japan was 
helpful in preventing the Japanese economy from going into recession.  As Overholt 
(2005) notes  
 
 
Chinese demand provided the stimulus that lifted Japan out of recession 
[during the slowdown in world economic growth following the collapse of 
the technology bubble on the stock market].  It is difficult to overstate the 
risk the world economy faced from the Japanese situation, where 
mountainous debt created the risk of a domino-like collapse inside Japan 
and subsequent rippling collapses around the world.  That risk seems to 
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have passed, helped by a critical margin of stimulus from China.   Few 
books are written about global depressions that never happened, but it is 
quite possible that China’s globalisation saved us from beginning the new 
century with a drastic global economic squeeze. 
 
 
Developing countries in general have benefited from the demand stimulus for raw 
materials and commodities provided by fast economic growth in China and India 
leading also to faster economic growth elsewhere.  Sustained growth in these two 
countries thus provides a stable source for the growth of world demand in general with 
favourable effects on the developing as well as developed countries. 
 
The aggregate and sectoral demand effects of Chinese and Indian economic expansion 
manifest themselves in other ways too.  For example, the production of cheap goods in 
India and China, particularly in the latter, helps reduce inflationary pressures in 
advanced countries thereby allowing their economies to be run at higher levels of output 
and employment than they otherwise would.  Unfortunately, there are few empirical 
studies which quantify the effects of this channel.  IMF (2006) has recently explored the 
question of the effects of globalisation on inflation.  These effects are estimated to be in 
general quite small – a reduction in inflation of the order of 0.25 percent, although 
estimates rise to 1 percent or more for specific years and specific countries.  These 
studies, however, are unable to measure the full extent of the effects of globalisation on 
reducing the general level of prices, in large part because the real influence of 
globalisation is in this instance not directly quantifiable.   As Raghuram Rajan (2006) 
notes:  “In my view, however, the true impact of globalisation has been in contributing 
to wage and price restraint at a time when central bankers were establishing their 
inflation-fighting credibility, thus allowing them to achieve targets and gain credibility 
without the need to tighten to politically difficult levels” (IMF (2006), p. xi). 
 
The favourable impact of Chinese and Indian economic growth on the US economy 
comes also through other related channels.  For example, it is estimated that lower 
prices for basic goods as a result of trade with China, India and other developing 
countries has contributed significantly to the standard of living of low-paid American 
citizens.  Preliminary estimates suggest that these lower prices help raise standards of 
living of poor Americans by about 5 to 10 per cent.  Similarly, Chinese purchases of US 
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Treasury bonds have helped to finance US budget deficits without which the US would 
have had higher interest rates and hence slower growth.  Although these may be 
regarded as short-term measures, they have nevertheless helped to keep up for several 
years the rate of growth of the US economy and hence of the world economy.  This 
issue will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
There are undoubtedly also some negative effects of Chinese and Indian economic 
growth on the US economy.  The most important of these is the competition from the 
two countries for the world’s scarce raw materials and commodities.  The enormous 
Chinese and Indian demand for these products, including oil, helps raise their prices and 
thereby, other things being equal, disadvantage the US economy.  Even taking this 
negative factor into account, the overall balance of globalisation for the US economy is 
certainly likely to be favourable, particularly if the world’s nation states adopt in the 
future a mutually advantageous cooperative attitude towards issues concerning 
environment and scarcity of raw materials.  
 
The above considerations do not show adequately, if at all, in the three generations 
(namely those covering the periods 1962-1980, 1980-2000 and 2000-2005 respectively) 
of conventional studies of the impact of globalisation on US labour markets.  This is 
partly because these studies are partial equilibrium ones rather than general equilibrium 
studies.  There is very little research of the latter kind that is available.  There is, 
however, a recent contribution by Bailey and Lawrence (2006) that addresses this 
methodological problem to some extent.  The two authors examine changes in 
employment between 2000 and 2003 in the US economy, a period which has been 
marked by a relatively short recession.  The strong upturn following the recession did 
not however lead to much net job creation, and hence the emergence of ‘jobless 
growth.’  In the normal public discourse, these unfavourable labour market outcomes, 
are blamed on globalisation, including outsourcing of service jobs to India.  The authors 
carry out their empirical analysis on a detailed individual industry basis.  They use the 
following empirical model, as well as an input-output model of the US economy to 
address these questions.  
 
 ei   =   wd  (d   -   v  )  +  wx   (x   -   v  ) -  wm   (m   -   v  )   
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Where ei connotes percentage change in employment; wd, wx and wm are the weights 
attached to domestic use, imports and exports respectively.  This equation is an ex-post 
identity, in which “percentage change in employment is equal to the weighted average 
of the percentage changes in the differences between the growth rate of labor 
productivity and value added due to domestic use, value added due to exports, and value 
added attributable to imports” (p.229). 
 
Using this framework, the authors conclude that of the 950,000 net manufacturing jobs 
lost by the year 2003, only 105,000 were due to trade and the remaining 845,000 to 
reduced growth of domestic demand (see Sichel 2004, p.279). 
 
Thus Baily and Lawrence’s paper suggests that the jobless growth in the US economy in 
the first half of this decade was not due to globalisation as is commonly believed, but to 
other factors.  It further indicates that imports from the Third World, including out-
sourcing, had a negligible impact on US labour markets.  Much the greater impact of 
globalisation came from reduced US exports to other countries that was mainly a result 
of the appreciation of the US dollar against other currencies.  The other main reason for 
the jobless growth and unfavourable labour market outcomes such as job instability 
arose from insufficient expansion of aggregate demand in the US economy.  Although 
Baily and Lawrence’s contribution represents a methodological advance over previous 
studies, even this does not yet provide a fully satisfactory general equilibrium model. 
Baily and Lawrence assume that the rate of growth of productivity is an exogenous 
variable, which many analysts would regard as being eminently endogenous. 
 
Although Professor Freeman has raised the right question about the potential for 
disruption which doubling of the labour force raises, he perhaps under-estimates the 
capacity of the US economy to provide employment and adjustment to those who would 
lose their jobs as a result of competition.  As John Hicks suggests, although there is no 
guarantee that all those who have lost their jobs due to competition in the product 
markets will find jobs elsewhere, the probability is much higher that they will do so in a 
fast-growing, dynamic economy than in a stagnant, low-income economy.  The US, 
during the last ten years in particular, is precisely the former kind of economy.  
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Table 7 provides the data on growth, productivity, IT services and other relevant 
variables for G7 countries on a comparable basis.  This research by Professor Jorgensen 
and his colleagues (Jorgensen et al., 2005) is the most authoritative work on the subject. 
It represents immense scholarship and exceptional hard work as it provides comparable 
data for all these countries, particularly in relation to the input and output of IT services, 
adjusted for quality changes.  This table provides data for the period 1980-2000.22  The 
notable features of the table from the perspective of this paper are the following: 
 
• During the period 1995-2000, the US economy has been by far the fastest 
growing economy among G7 countries with a growth rate considerably higher 
than that of European countries as well as Japan.  The Japanese economy 
performs better than the US in terms of the growth of labour productivity over 
this period.  However, whereas hours worked arose by 1.99 percentage points in 
the US, in Japan these fell by 0.79 percentage points.  Taking output and 
employment together, the US performance was clearly the best of all G7 
countries.  
 
• In addition, there is general agreement that the US economy has continued to 
perform strongly in the new millennium.  The figures for the period 2000-2005 
indicate that the productivity growth rate accelerated further and the country 
recorded during this period the highest productivity growth in its history. 
Overall, the data suggest that since 1995 the US economy has achieved a trend 
increase in its long-term historic growth rate of almost one percentage point per 
                                                 
22 The methodology underlying this analysis is succinctly summarised by Professor Jorgensen (2001) as 
follows:  ‘Under the assumption that product and factor markets are competitive, producer equilibrium 
implies that the share-weighted growth of outputs is the sum of the share-weighted growth of inputs and 
growth in total factor productivity: 
 
wI,n ∆ In In + wI,c ∆ In Ic + wI,s∆ In Is 
 + wI,t∆ In It + wC,n∆ In Cn 
 + wC,c∆ In Cc 
 =  vK,n∆ In Kn + vK,c∆ In Kc
  + vK,s∆ In Ks + vK,t∆ In Kt
  + vL∆ In L + ∆ In A 
 
where w and v denote average value shares. The shares of outputs and inputs add to one under the 
additional assumption of constant returns, 
 
wI,n + wI,c + wI,s + wI,t + wC,n + wC,c = vK,n + vK,c + vK,s + vK,t + vL = 1.’ 
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annum.  This surge in productivity growth in part contributed to the US 
phenomena of jobless growth in the early parts of this decade.  Table 8 provides 
Jorgensen, Ho and Stiroh’s most up-to-date data on pre- and post-1995 changes 
in productivity growth in the US economy.  It suggests that the 1.57 percentage 
points difference between productivity growth in the periods 1973-95 and 1995-
2003 respectively was about half due to an increase in capital per person 
including IT technology (i.e., capital deepening) and half due to an increase in 
total factor productivity.  In view of the aging of the labour force the 
contribution of the labour input to productivity growth was slightly negative. 
 
• In short, the above data suggest that the US has one of the most dynamic 
economies in the world.  The US dynamism is remarkable for the fact that it is 
not a catch-up economy but a frontier economy which has to do the hard work of 
discovering new knowledge in order to achieve sustained growth.  In these 
circumstances the significant recent trend increase in output and productivity 
growth rates over that of the last hundred years is quite extraordinary.  
 
Professor Freeman raises two other issues that require comment in the light of the 
discussion above.  He is worried about the US economy being able to retain its 
technological lead in view of the much larger number of science and engineering 
graduates in developing countries.  This apprehension also seems to be somewhat 
overdrawn.  It is indeed true that India and China have large educated labour forces, but 
their capacity to innovate is hugely below that of the US.  This is because innovation 
does not just depend upon the ideas of science and engineering graduates, but also 
importantly on the scientific and technical infrastructure, on the country’s technical 
culture, and on organizational capabilities of firms.  In these respects, the US is way 
ahead of India and China and will remain so for a long time.  Baumol (2002) has 
convincingly argued that the US industrial structure of oligopolistic competition 
between giant firms is capitalism’s built-in innovating machine.  There is no reason to 
believe that this machine will become any less potent in the future.  However, it may 
also be the case that substantial government intervention may also be required in this 
area to achieve the desired social goals.  The US economic historian, William Lazonik 
suggests that the US government is already doing a great deal of work in this area. 
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Finally, Professor Freeman’s point about investment is critical.  However, the inherent 
dynamism of the US economy suggests that it will continue to be an attractive place 
both for domestic and foreign companies.  This issue is taken up in the section below. 
 
VII.  World Financial Imbalances 
 
In order for current globalisation to be sustainable it must not only address the fears and 
anxieties of high-waged workers and salary-earners of advanced countries, but also the 
difficulties of China and India in continuing with their industrial revolutions on 
integration with the world economy.  With respect to the latter an important issue 
concerns current existence of huge global financial imbalances which, depending on the 
way the rebalancing occurs would have a profound influence on the short- and medium-
term prospects of developed as well as developing countries; it may indeed also affect 
their long-term growth and development prospects.  Not only is the resolution of these 
imbalances salient for the countries running such imbalances (e.g., China and US), it 
will also profoundly effect the prospects of countries like India which are not regarded 
as being contributors to these imbalances.  
 
There are several debates in this area – starting with the blame game of who is 
responsible for these imbalances, the profligate US consumer or the savings surplus of 
the Asian countries due to their low levels of investment.  Larry Summers (2005) in a 
recent paper argues that there are important facts that do not tally with the former 
theory.  Specifically, he observes that the world today is awash with savings and the 
world interest rates are low.  If it were the case, that the US was extracting savings from 
all over the world at the expense of investment opportunities elsewhere, that should 
have raised the real world interest rates instead of keeping them low.  
 
A major manifestation of the global imbalances today is the huge and persistent current 
account deficit of the US economy.  Contrary to what is commonly believed, it is not 
matched by a similarly large and persistent surplus of the Chinese economy.  China 
does have a huge current account surplus with the US but this is a bilateral interaction of 
the two economies.  Overall, the Chinese current account has a much smaller surplus, 
constituting less than 8 percent of the total world surplus of countries that have positive 
current account balances (see Table 9). As the table shows, the Chinese surplus is 
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considerably smaller than that of Japan or Germany in 2004.  Table 9 also shows that in 
2004 the US current account deficit amounted to nearly $666 billion dollars and it 
comprised 69% of the total deficit of countries running negative current account 
balances that year.  In the last quarter of 2005, the US deficit was estimated to be $700 
billion dollars, or 7% of GDP.  Thus an already high deficit in proportion to GDP for 
the US has been getting bigger, which on the face of it is not a healthy development.  
Nevertheless, the markets seem to have accepted the situation as indicated by the 
relative stability of the exchange rates of the main currencies  (See Cooper (2005); 
Summers (2006)). 
 
 Another related manifestation of global imbalances is the huge and growing foreign 
currency reserves of the Chinese Central Bank.  In stock terms the value of these 
reserves is estimated to be around a trillion US dollars, or as Martin Wolf puts it, it 
amounts to US $600 for each man, woman and child in the country. 
 
A central analytical and policy question at issue is whether the above imbalances can 
safely be left to the market forces for an automatic, though perhaps not necessarily swift 
resolution.  If so that would constitute an optimistic soft-landing scenario for the US and 
the world economy.  However, many serious analysts suggest that there maybe a hard 
landing instead.  The latter may be triggered by any number of proximate causes 
including the collapse in US consumer confidence due to the high-level of consumer 
debt.  Such a scenario could arise from irrational exuberance or pessimism of the 
investors leading to a fall in their “speculative confidence” in the sense the term is used 
by J M Keynes in the General Theory (See further Izzuteria and McKinley (2006)).  The 
collapse in asset values could in principle also be triggered by an abrupt change in 
Chinese government policy of financing the US deficit by buying US Treasury paper.  
A policy change may be prompted by say, an unexpected devaluation of the dollar and 
the perception that it may be subject to further downward movement. 
 
There are also however, important arguments against a hard landing.  These include first 
of all the question of why such an event has not happened so far.  Many economists 
have been suggesting hard-landing scenario for a long time, none of which has yet 
materialised.  It may well be the case that there are significant forces that protect the 
value of the dollar and not allow it to go into a freefall.  These forces have, in part, been 
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discussed in section VI and include the outstanding record of the US real economy 
during the last decade and its inherent strength and dynamism; the fact that in geo-
political terms US is a much safer haven for the capitalist world than the currencies of 
other countries such as those of the Eurozone and Japan. 
 
So although there are reasons to believe that the hard-landing may not necessarily 
happen, the probability of its occurrence cannot be ruled out.  In view of the damage 
such an event can cause to economic growth in DCs as well as ACs, an appropriate 
policy response would involve orderly rebalancing of the surpluses and deficits by 
cooperation between countries.  There is by now a general consensus that the optimal 
solution would require concerted actions by both surplus and deficit countries. 
Specifically the leading surplus countries including China would need to revalue their 
currencies while the US and other deficit countries may need to devalue.  It would also 
require relatively faster growth of aggregate demand in the Eurozone and Japan and 
correspondingly slower growth in the deficit countries such as the US Such international 
cooperation implies deep interference with the market forces that is inconsistent with 
current globalisation of free trade and free capital movements.  This alternative 
globalisation, based on close cooperation between countries, is able to provide 
coordination, prevent potentially dangerous market failures of current globalisation and 
achieve socially desirable outcomes.  Such alternative globalisation is more likely to 
result in the positive-sum outcomes from international trade and capital movements, 
both for rich and poor countries, for China and India as well as the US.  This point will 
be developed further in the next section.  
  
VIII.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This paper has reviewed both economic theory as well as several generations of 
empirical work on the effects of the fast expansion of exports from developing countries 
including China and India on the labour markets of the ACs.  Taking into account the 
positive as well as the negative and the direct as well as the indirect effects, the most up-
to-date empirical works suggest that globalisation has a relatively small effect on output 
and employment in the US, which is just as likely to be favourable as unfavourable.  
Much of the previous work, by being of the partial equilibrium kind, did not adequately 
take into account the positive and indirect effects of globalisation on labour market 
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outcomes in the ACs.  There are very few empirical models that are able to satisfactorily 
incorporate all the relevant variables and their interactions; the subject needs urgent 
further research.  This is all the more necessary in view of the high-profile public policy 
interest, which North-South competition in goods and services attracts. 
 
This paper has paid particular attention to the important new work of Professor Freeman 
which suggests that even if trade with the Third World has not in the past seriously 
disadvantaged workers in the North, the doubling of the global labour force with the 
entry of India and China into the liberalised global economy in the new millennium may 
have profoundly unfavourable repercussions for workers in ACs.  This paper has 
welcomed Professor Freeman’s pioneering and original contribution to this debate. It is 
broadly in sympathy with some of his analysis but it also contains a friendly and 
constructive criticism of parts of the Freeman argument.  Two major points of 
difference with Freeman have been emphasized here.  The first concerns his inadequate 
attention to the demand side variables, which may in part address the supply side 
problems arising from the entry of India and China.  Secondly on the supply side, he 
does not give adequate recognition to the inherent economic strength and dynamics of 
the US economy and its innovative large corporations, which should enable the U.S to 
maintain its technological leadership. 
 
The present paper suggests that there are significant forces at work both on the demand 
and the supply sides which indicate that notwithstanding the size of the two countries, 
the effects of China’s and India’s industrial revolutions on advanced countries in the 
future can be accommodated just as well as those of Japan and Italy were in the past 
during their periods of rapid industrialization in the 1950’s and 1960’s (See further 
Singh, 2005; UNCTAD, 1995).  As elaborated in UNCTAD (1995) and Singh (2005), 
this accommodation occurred in the golden age, mainly because of faster OECD and 
world GDP growth. 
 
Although the analysis here indicates that Professor Freeman is perhaps unduly 
pessimistic about the prospects of the US economy in response to Chinese and Indian 
industrial revolutions, he has nevertheless raised extremely important policy questions 
that deserve the attention of economists now and in the future.  These will be examined 
below.  
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Policy Implications 
 
It was noted in the introduction that the current globalisation of free trade and free 
capital movements can only survive as a way of organizing the world economy if it is 
able to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of citizens both in rich and poor countries.  The 
underlying policy question that has been examined in this paper is whether India and 
China’s industrial revolutions, which are a social imperative for these countries, can be 
sustained and made compatible with the desired labour market outcomes in rich 
countries.  Meeting the twin objectives of sustaining the industrial revolution in the two 
giant Asian countries, together with maintaining, say, full employment, with rising real 
wages in the US, faces major constraints in each case, at both the national and 
international levels.  Although the national constraints (e.g., savings and investments 
rates, mobility of resources) are as important, if not more so, this paper has by and large 
focussed only on the international framework.  It must however be recognised that 
coping with international constraints often requires changes both in national policies of 
the individual nation states as well as the international polices of the relevant 
multilateral institutions.   
 
We have already seen that current globalisation has serious difficulties in meeting the 
twin objectives outlined above.  As seen earlier, even the intellectually relatively 
straightforward problems of global financial imbalances cannot be left to the market 
forces for their resolution.  Coordination and cooperation between nation states are 
much the better way, if not the only way, of resolving these difficulties.  This applies 
even more so to other main shortcomings of current globalisation that are salient to the 
themes of this paper.  Firstly, as Professor Freeman rightly points out, the present 
international framework and the management of the world economy favours capital at 
the expense of labour.  This is despite the fact that the latter is already burdened with 
bearing most of the costs of adjustment to global economic integration.  The 
international financial institutions, namely the World Bank and the IMF, which greatly 
influence economic policy in developing countries, generally promote the interests of 
capital, rather than that of labour, giving precedence, for example, to fighting inflation 
than to promoting the growth of output and employment.   This must be altered. 
However, it would require major changes in the mindset and approaches of these 
institutions to economic and social issues.  Thus, instead of encouraging export-led 
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growth all over the world these institutions should be calling for balanced growth, based 
more on national consumption and investment than on foreign demand.  Similarly 
instead of encouraging capital account liberalisation in developing countries, they 
should permit them to have capital controls, and indeed help them to devise suitable 
methods for implementing such controls. 
 
Secondly, it will be appreciated that the twin objectives above, namely: 
a. sustaining India and China’s industrial revolutions, and 
b. without jeopardising employment and real wages in the North 
are certainly feasible on the supply side.  With the new paradigm technology of 
information and communication revolution, with catch-up possibilities in India and 
China and elsewhere, the world economy on the supply side is capable of growing at a 
rate which can more than meet these requirements.   However, the main constraints to 
faster growth lie on the demand side.  In previous contributions (Singh, 2000; Singh & 
Zammit, 2000, 2005) have argued that the coordination failures on the demand side are 
the main obstacles to faster economic expansion.  In order for the rate of growth of real 
world demand to be compatible with production possibilities on the supply side, either 
new institutions are required, or existing ones (e.g., the IMF and the World Bank) given 
a different mandate to resolve the coordination problems on a sustained long term basis.   
 
These authors also point out that a faster rate of growth of real world aggregate demand 
will also lead to a greater and deeper use of the new ICT technology in various sectors 
of the economy.  This should result in a virtuous circle of increased demand, increased 
growth of output, and increased productivity – as is normally the case with the 
introduction of technological innovations.   
 
However, it must be emphasized that industrial countries cannot affect a trend increase 
in the rate of growth of real aggregate demand by simply using normal fiscal and 
monetary policies.  In order to be effective and not lead to further payments 
disequilibria between leading industrialized countries, it would be necessary for the 
demand expansion to be coordinated.   Moreover, past experience suggests that there 
will still be some need for restrictive institutional mechanisms at the national level, so 
that an increase in aggregate monetary demand translates itself into an expansion of real 
demand, and is not simply dissipated by a rise in wages and prices.  Thus, despite the 
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recent price stability in the industrialized countries, pay coordinating mechanisms may 
be necessary to ensure that increased aggregate demand does not lead to rising prices. 
These mechanisms generally take the form of social contacts between workers, 
employers and governments (see further Van der Hoeven and Lübker (2006)). 
 
To sum up, faster growth of world demand is easier to organize today than in the past.  
This is mainly because of industrial revolutions in China and India and the social 
imperative for these countries to achieve faster growth of output and employment to 
meet the basic needs of their people.  China and India together constitute about twenty 
(20) percent of the world demand and therefore represent a new growth pole for the 
world economy.  Further, in this context, Krugman’s 1994 observation on changes in 
productivity growth and growth of real wages and real demand continue to be highly 
relevant.  Krugman noted:  
 
Economic history offers no example of a country that experienced long-
term productivity growth without a roughly equal rise in real wages.  In 
the 1950s, when European productivity was typically less than half of 
US productivity, so were European wages; today average compensation 
measured in dollars is about the same.  Japan climbed the productivity 
ladder over the past thirty years, its wages also rose from 10 per cent to 
110 per cent of the US level.  (Krugman, 1994, p.116) 
 
Although there have been fears that China will not obey Krugman’s law, all the signs 
are that with the continuing boom, many sectors of Chinese workers are able to obtain 
real wage increases close to the achieved rate of growth of productivity.  This augurs 
well for the harmonious development for India and China as well as the US and the 
North, albeit under alternative rather than current globalisation. 
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Graph 1. Trends in Real GDP Growth: China, India, developing economies, and the world 
1965- 2003  
(Average annual percentage growth) 
 
Source: Adapted from Dasgupta and Singh (2005). 
 
 
Graph 2 
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Table 1. Population, GDP and GDP per capita, 1900-2030 
 
(selected countries and the world) 
 
GDP per Capita 1900 - 2030 
  GDP per capita (1990 INT $) 
  1900 1950 1990 2001 2030 
W Europe 2,893 4,579 15,966 19,256 30,503
USA 4,091 9,561 23,201 27,948 44,286
Japan 1,180 1,921 18,789 20,683 32,774
China 545 439 1,858 3,583 11,174
India 599 619 1,309 1,957 6,103
World 1,262 2,111 5,157 6,049 11,689
 
 
Population 1900 - 2030 
  Population (million) 
  1900 1950 1990 2001 2030 
W Europe 234 305 377 392 392
USA 76 152 250 285 358
Japan 44 84 124 127 121
China 400 547 1,135 1,275 1,477
*India 285 359 839 1,024 1,414
World 1,564 2,524 5,260 6,149 7,655
*India: 1950 population including Bangladesh and Pakistan   
 
GDP 1900 - 2030 
  GDP (billion 1990 int. $) 
  1900 1950 1990 2001 2030 
W Europe 676 1,396 6,033 7,550 11,964
USA 313 1,456 5,803 7,965 15,851
Japan 52 161 2,321 2,625 3,975
China 218 240 2,109 4,570 16,504
India 171 222 1,098 2,003 8,630
World 1,974 5,330 27,122 37,194 89,480
 
 
GDP per Capita (annual average compound growth rate) 1900 - 2030 
  1900-50 1950-90 1990-2001 2001-30 
W Europe 0.92 3.17 1.72 1.6
USA 1.71 2.24 1.71 1.6
Japan 0.98 5.87 0.88 1.6
China -0.43 3.67 6.15 4.0
India 0.07 1.89 3.72 4.0
World 1.03 2.26 1.46 2.3
 
Source: Maddison(2005), Memorandum by Professor Angus Maddison  
Retrieved on 03/06/2006 from: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeconaf/12/12we14.htm  
 43
Table 2. Real GDP per Capita and Growth in China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea 
during their rapid growth periods  
 
 
Real GDP per capita (dollars) Average growth rate (per cent) 
Market pricesa PPPb
 
 
 
Year  
1 
Year  
10 
Year  
20 2003 
Year 
1 
Year 
10 
Year 
20 2000 
1st 
decade
2nd  
decade 
3rd  
decade 
4th  
decade
1st 20
 years
China(1979) 163 347 752 1,067 1,023 1,752 3,276 3,747 8.6 8.1 . . 8.3 
India(1980) 222 304 440 511 1,159 1,634 2,414 2,479 3.7 3.8 . . 3.7 
Japan(1957) 5,481 11,575 20,763 38,222 3,605 7,515 13,544 24,675 8.4 6.1 2.9 2.9 7.2 
Rep. Of 
Korea (1965) 1,297 2,397 4,149 12,232 1,803 3,501 6,237 15,876 6.7 5.7 7.5 4.2c 6.2 
United States . . . 35,566 . . . 33,293 . . . . . 
 
Source: UN (2005), Trade and development report, 2005. pp29. 
a In constant 2000 dollars 
b In constant 1996 dollars 
c The Republic of Korea’s average growth rate in the 4th decade covers only 9 years due to data 
constraints 
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Table 3. Recent Economic Development in India and China: Some Salient Facts 
 
 
2002     CHINA   INDIA 
 
Gross national savings  44% of GDP   22% of GDP 
 
Trade in Goods   49% of GDP   21% of GDP 
 
 
2003 
 
Share in World merchandise              5.8% (4th in World)   0.7% (31st in  
Exports  World)                                        
 
 
Share in World exports of  
Commercial Services   2.6% (9th in World)   1.4% (21st in  
World) 
 
 
1992-2001 
 
Weighted average tariff  Fell from 35.6% to   Fell from 70.8% to 
     12.8%    28.4% 
 
2003 
 
Inward Stock of Foreign                       $501.5 bn   $30.8 bn 
Direct Investment  
 
FDI inflow    $ 53.5 bn   $ 4.3 bn 
      (4% of capital formation) (12.4% of capital formation) 
 
 
2000  
 
Illiteracy    6%    35%  
 
 
1996-2002 
 
Private investment 
• In telecommunications $13 bn    $ 9.2 bn 
• In energy   $14.3 bn   $ 7.5 bn 
• In transport   $15.9 bn   $ 2.3 bn 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Martin Wolf’s various columns, Financial Times (2005). 
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Table 4. Sectoral distribution of GDP: 1960, 1980 and 2000 
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Table 5.   Employment in Manufacturing (% of total) 
 
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 4.8 6.2 5.5 5.5 
Latin America 15.4 16.3 16.5 16.8 14.2 
Southern Cone and Brazil 17.4 17.2 16.2 16.6 11.8 
South Asia 8.7 9.2 10.7 13.0 13.9 
NICs 1.. 10.5 12.9 18.5 21.0 16.1 
China 10.9 11.5 10.3 13.5 12.3 
India 9.5 - 11.0 11.7 12.0 
 
 
Source: Calculations made using statistics from the ILO Databank.  Regional averages 
are weighted by economically active population. Re-produced from Palma, 2004. 
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Table 6. Shares in World Exports of Manufacturesa of Selected Asian Developing Economies And 
Major Developed Countries, 1962-2003 
 
 
Total Manufactures (Percentage) 
  
Period United States United Kingdom Japan 
Republican  
of Korea China 
1962-1965 19.2 12.2 7.1 0.1 . 
1966-1970 17.2 9.6 9.1 0.2 . 
1971-1975 14.4 7.8 11.1 0.7 . 
1976-1980 13.8 7.6 12.2 1.5 . 
1981-1985 14.5 6.3 14.9 2.3 0.9 
1986-1990 11.9 6.1 13.5 2.7 1.5 
1991-1995 13.1 5.4 12.2 2.9 2.9 
1996-2000 13.3 5.3 9.4 3.0 3.9 
2001-2003 12.0 5.1 8.1 3.1 6.2 
 
 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2005, pp78. 
 
a SITC 5-8 less 68. 
 
b Including Puerto Rico for 1962-1980. 
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Table 7.  Sources of Labour Productivity Growth 
 
Year   US Canada UK  France Germany Italy Japan 
 
Output 
 
1980- 1989  3.34 2.96 2.72 2.61 2.15 2.47 4.41 
1989-1995  2.36 1.00 1.65 1.49 1.67 1.51 2.51 
1995-2000  4.10 3.63 2.64 2.44 1.78 1.90 2.13 
Hours 
 
1980- 1989  1.79 1.87 0.82 -0.66 0.11 0.15 0.56 
1989-1995  1.02 0.20 -1.17 -0.41 -0.71 -0.57 -0.67 
1995-2000  1.99 2.31 1.08 1.04 -0.05 0.95 -0.71 
 
Labor Productivity 
 
1980- 1989  1.55 1.08 1.90 3.27 2.04 2.32 3.84 
1989-1995  1.34 0.80 2.82 1.90 2.38 2.08 3.17 
1995-2000  2.11 1.32 1.56 1.41 1.83 0.96 2.84 
 
IT Capital Deepening 
 
1980- 1989  0.41 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.42 
1989-1995  0.43 0.34 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.33 
1995-2000  0.87 0.46 0.64 0.30 0.41 0.38 0.81 
 
Non-IT Capital Deepening 
 
1980- 1989  0.31 0.51 0.76 3.08 1.17 2.22 1.20 
1989-1995  0.32 0.36 1.48 1.43 1.38 1.08 1.42 
1995-2000  0.39 -0.03 -0.27 0.31 1.01 0.85 0.66 
 
Labour Quality 
 
1980- 1989  0.30 0.55 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.87 
1989-1995  0.36 0.42 0.50 0.59 0.33 0.38 0.53 
1995-2000  0.21 0.23 0.33 0.34 0.21 0.46 0.29 
 
Productivity from IT Production 
 
1980- 1989  0.22 0.14 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.23 
1989-1995  0.25 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.29 
1995-2000  0.44 0.21 0.62 0.43 0.57 0.62 0.61 
 
Productivity from Non-IT Production 
 
1980- 1989  0.31 -0.38 0.62 -0.45 0.20 -0.65 1.12 
1989-1995  -0.02 -0.46 0.37 -0.52 0.12 0.06 0.60 
1995-2000  0.20 0.45 0.24 0.03 -0.38 -1.35  0.47 
 
Note: Percentage. Contribution. Canada data begins in 1981 
Source: Jorgensen (2004). 
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Table 8.  Explaining the Productivity Surge in the US 
 
Average Annual Growth 1973-95 1995-03 Difference 
Labour productivity 1.49 3.06 1.57 
O/w capital deepening 0.89 1.75 0.86 
Labour quality 0.26 0.17 -0.09 
Total factor productivity 0.34 1.14 0.80 
Source: Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh 
 
 
Table 9.  Current-account balances, selected economies, 2000-2004 
 
2000 2002 2004 2000 2002 2004 
Economies               Year 
($ Billion) 
(As a percentage of total  
surplus or deficit) 
Japan 119.6 112.6 171.8 23.8 21.9 19.3 
Germany -25.7 43.1 96.4 3.9 8.4 10.9 
China 20.5 35.4 70.0 4.1 6.9 7.9 
Russian 
Federation 44.6 30.9 59.6 8.9 6.0 6.7 
Surplus 
Economies 
Saudi Arabia 14.3 11.9 49.3 2.9 2.3 5.5 
United States -413.5 -473.9 -665.9 62.2 72.5 69.0 
Spain -19.4 -15.9 -49.2 2.9 2.4 5.1 
United Kingdom -36.5 -26.4 -47.0 5.5 4.0 4.9 
Australia -15.3 -16.6 -39.4 2.3 2.5 4.1 
Deficit 
Economies 
Italy -5.8 -6.7 -24.8 0.9 1.0 2.6 
 
 
Adapted from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005. 
Note: Calculations are based on a total of 180 countries; the sum of total surpluses and 
deficits is different from zero because of errors and omissions. Countries are listed 
according to the levels of their surplus/deficit in 2004 
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